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ABSTRACT 
 
The main starting point of this paper is the idea that trade unions do 
not only care about real wage level but also about a reference or 
aspiration wage level. After citing a number of empirical works, the 
paper argues that the attainment of the reference wage is a priority 
for the union. This implies that there is a hierarchical character in union 
objectives. A two-step union utility function is  suggested in order to 
capture the change in priority once the prime objective (the 
reference  wage level) was reached. The analysis is conducted in an 
efficient bargain framework, and shows that employment-wage  
combinations come into the picture only when the reference wage is  
reached.  In a unionized economy, this implies that substantial 
increases in employment will take place only after the  union 
reference wage has been met. 
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I .Introduction 
 
The idea that trade unions pay considerable attention to the “appropriate” 
or “fair”  level of wage has started to receive increasing attention. One can 
trace the origins of this idea to Keynes who suggested that relative wage 
considerations matter (Keynes,1973,pp.13,14). Subsequent versions of the 
concept can be detected in Duesenberry’s (1949) work which implies that 
wage settlements are interdependent. Modern versions of the same idea 
can be found in Gylfason and Lindbeck (1984; 1986) who suggest that 
unions  set an aspiration wage which is connected to the rest of the 
industry’s wage or to the average national wage. The work of Frank (1984) 
about aspiration wage can be seen in the same context. Similarly, the fair 
wage hypothesis of Akerlof and Yellen (1990) can also be placed in the 
same framework. 
 
The gist of the above approaches is that unions have an aspiration wage 
level  or reference wage (w*) which can be linked to the previous period 
wage, to the industry’s level or to a perception of a fair wage. In particular, 
the union might see the attainment of w* as its primary concern. This implies 
that the other goals of the union (mainly employment) acquire higher 
significance once w* has been reached. Thus, there is a type of priority or 
hierarchy which characterizes union objectives  (goals are hierarchical). With 
this in mind, one can maintain that the reference  wage (w*) plays a 
principal role in the union’s utility function. One can offer a number of 
empirical indications that support this type of union behaviour. 
 
Given the above, this paper starts with a discussion of the empirical 
evidence supporting the role of the aspiration wage. Consequently, the 
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paper suggests a simple example of a union utility function which 
incorporates the aspiration wage and the idea that it is the primary concern 
of the union until it is reached. Finally, the implications of the adoption of 
such a union utility in an efficient bargain framework are examined.  
  
II Empirical Indications  
 
As was pointed out, the issue of the reference wage is not new. Apart from 
the fact that it can be found in early theoretical works, several recent 
papers on union behaviour have employed this concept. For instance, in the 
works of  Hamermesh (1975), Oswald (1986), Summers (1988), Gylfason and 
Lindbeck (1984) and Akerlof and Yellen (1990) one can find the idea that 
workers do not only care about real wage level but also about relative 
wages. There is  also a substantial number of  empirical papers which 
support this view. Eckstein and Wilson (1962) found that “key groups” 
industries in US manufacturing determine to a large extent wage changes in 
“non-key groups” industries. Similarly, wage changes in Swedish non-
manufacturing sector were found to be influenced by changes in the 
manufacturing sector (Jakobsson and Lindbeck, 1971). In addition, Flanagan 
(1976) found strong indications of wage interdependence in US 
Manufacturing. More recently the work of Holmlund and Skedinger (1990) 
concerning the Swedish experience, implies that outside or reference wages 
are quite important for wage setting at the local level. In the same spirit, 
recent empirical evidence indicates that the idea of fair wage (connected 
to the national or industry’s level) is crucial in union negotiations in the US 
(Jacoby and Mitchell,1990).  
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All of the above point to the empirical relevance of the reference wage. This 
implies that w* should be included in the standard formulations of union 
utility functions.  Given this, one can also argue that  the  attainment of the 
reference wage is a priority for the union. More specifically, the union will put 
much effort in reaching the reference wage first before systematically 
attempting to reach its other goals. As Flanagan, Moene and Wallerstein 
(1993) suggest, there is evidence that the union will be very concerned to 
reach a wage level compatible with wages agreed in national wage 
bargaining agreements. In support of this view, Oswald (1992) found that 
union leaders pay substantial attention to reference income. This suggests 
that the union utility function should express the strong preference for 
reaching w*. In support of the empirical indications, the strong preference 
towards reaching the reference wage can be theoretically justified in terms 
of the union leaders. more specifically, Swint and Nelson (1978, 1980) suggest 
that  union leaders are interested in “providing some level of members 
benefits first”. Clearly, the attainment of w* can be essential for the survival 
or the reelection of the union leaders (for a discussion see Mayhew and 
Turnbull (1989). Furthermore, the concept of unions setting a wage target 
might be much more empirically relevant in a centralized bargaining 
framework  where a leading nationally-based industrial union negotiates 
with a representative group of employers (see Calmfors and Driffill, 1988 and 
also Hart and Moutos,1991)    
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  III   Analysis in an Efficient Bargain Framework 
 
Having in mind our previous discussion concerning union objectives and 
satisfactory wage target, we can construct a two step union utility function 
(see also Drakopoulos 1994). This type of function seems to be the most 
appropriate structure in order to portray the shift of emphasis on objectives. 
(For uses and justification of the two-step function in a union framework see 
Oswald 1986; Carruth and Oswald 1987; Jones and McKenna 1989 and 
Drakopoulos and Skatun 1992). For simplicity, the union is assumed to have 
two objectives, wages and employment.  In particular, the wage level is the 
primary objective up to a given level w*. The setting of w* can be related to 
a perception of the appropriate wage or even to  "fair" wage level. (For a 
discussion of this issue see  Oswald 1986, Summers, 1988 and Akerlof and 
Yellen, 1990).  When the union achieves that wage level (w*) then it turns its 
attention to the secondary objective which is employment. For simplicity 
and in order to concentrate on the hierarchical formulation, we assume that 
the outside opportunity is zero, that union members are identical and  that 
membership is unrestricted. We also make the additional assumption that we 
have an interior solution which means that membership is always higher than 
employment. The union utility function is given as follows:    
          
         [w + h(N)]N             for w < w*         (1) 
U =  
         w*N + [N + z(w)]N       for w > w*         (2) 
 
where h'(N) > 0 , h"(N) < 0, z'(w) > 0 , z"(w) < 0   (3) 
The structure of the utility function implies that the union has a strong 
preference towards wages until wages reach w*. After this level, the union 
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switches to employment as the main objective. As implied by (3), the 
functions h(N) and z(w) are concave. Specific functional forms can be: 
 
 h(N) = N1/2  or h(N) = lnN   
 
The same holds true for z(w). 
 
 
Given the above the union indifference curve can be found 
 
              
 
                          -w -h(N) - Nh'(N) 
                          ---------------------       < 0             (4) 
dw                               N 
dN  dU=0    =     
 
                          -w* -2N -z(w)             
                          -----------------         < 0             (5)  
                              Nz'(w) 
 
It is clear that the resulting indifference curve will have a kink at w*. We can 
see the effect more clearly  by taking the specific functional form h(N) = 
N1/2 and z(w) = w1/2 
 
          
                          -w -3/2N1/2 
                          -----------------       < 0 
dw                               N 
dN  dU=0     =     
 
                          -w* -2N - w1/2             
                          --------------------        < 0 
                              N 1/2w-1/2 
 
After checking for convexity, we can also see that in the region close to w* 
we have: 
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   dw                                     dw 
   dN lim w->w*-         >       dN lim w->w*+             
 
 
The above indifference curve is shown in figure1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
w* 
 
 
 
 
 
O                                N 
Figure 1 
 
In an efficient bargain framework, there is one union which negotiates over 
employment and wages with one employer. The two parts together fix a 
Pareto optimal bargain. The outcome of the bargain results in an efficient 
wage-employment combination (McDonald and Solow,1981). The 
implication here is that the union maximizes its utility function subject to a 
given profit constraint which is usually written as:.  
 
            pi = pf(N) - wN                              (6) 
 
where pi is profit, p is product price and f(N) is a strictly concave production 
function. The problem of the union when   w < w* is the following: 
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 max   U = [w + h(N)]N 
    w,N 
    s.t 
    pf(N) - wN > pi 
 
The solution of this problem gives us the contract curve for  w < w* which is: 
 
pf'(N) + h(N) + Nh'(N) = 0                            (7) 
 
The slope of the contract curve can be found by differentiation of the 
above and it is equal to infinity. This implies that the contract curve is a 
straight line at some level N1. When the wage is below the target level, the 
union will concentrate on wage only. 
 
 
 
 
When the wage exceeds the target level w*, then the union maximizes the 
function: U = w*N + [N +z(w)]N subject to the same profit constraint. The 
contract curve in this case is: 
 
pf'(N)z'(w) + w* + 2N + z(w) -wz'(w) = 0              (8) 
 
By differentiation we can find the slope of the contract curve which is : 
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dw               -pf"(N)z'(w) -2 
---     =       ---------------------                  (9) 
dN              pf'(N)z"(w) - wz"(w) 
 
The sign of the above is positive provided that:  
 
                   -pf"(N)z'(w) > -2                  (10) 
 
A positive sign implies a positive sloped contract curve above w*. In case 
that  
 
                  -pf"(N)z'(w) <  -2                  (11) 
 
then the contract curve will be horizontal because the wage level cannot 
fall beyond w*. By combining equation (9)  with equation (7) we can draw 
two possible contract curves: 
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Figure 2: Two possible contract curves                  
 
The employment level is constant up to wage level w*. However, the slope 
of the contract curve changes when the wage exceeds the target. 
Assuming relation (10) holds, increases in profit level are taken as increases in 
both wages and employment. A close look at relation (10) reveals that in 
order for (10) to be true,  the marginal productivity of labour should be falling 
rapidly (assuming z'(w) is constant). Thus wage increases are efficient. 
However, when relation (11) holds, the marginal productivity of labour is 
falling at a slow rate, and thus increases in profits are taken as employment 
only. 
 
It is also interesting to see the case when pf"(N) is constant but z'(w) is 
changing. In this case, relation (10) implies that the marginal utility of wage is 
high, and therefore an increase in the wage is efficient. If relation (11) holds 
then the marginal utility of wage is low and thus the contract curve is flat. 
-pf”(N)z’(w)>-2 
W* 
-pf”(N)z’(w)≤-2 
 
N N1 
o 
W 
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The important idea here is that employment acquires importance after w*. 
This can also be seen if we differentiate (8) with respect to p, holding 
employment constant: 
    
∂w               -f'(N)z'(w)  
---     =       ---------------------        < 0        (12)  
∂p              z"(w)[pf'(N) - w] 
 
The result implies that the contract curve shifts to the right when there is an 
increase in p. The negotiated level of employment is higher at any wage. 
 
 
IV  Conclusion 
 
The main starting point of this paper was the idea that trade unions do not 
only care about real wage level but also about a reference or aspiration 
wage level. The reference wage can be connected to the previous period 
wage or to the industry’s level. The paper argued that the attainment of the 
reference wage is a priority for the union. This implies that there is a 
hierarchical character in union objectives. Consequently, the paper cited a 
substantial number of empirical works which  provide strong indications 
about the importance of the reference wage. The theoretical implication of 
these points was that a  particular type of union utility function is needed. In 
particular, a two-step union utility function was suggested in order to 
capture the change in priority once the prime objective (the reference  
wage level) was reached.  After deriving the union indifference curves, the 
next step was to examine some implications for the economic analysis of the 
trade union in  an efficient bargain framework. One of the important points 
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was that employment-wage  combinations come into the picture only when 
the target wage was reached.  Assuming a unionized economy, this implies 
that substantial increases in employment will take place only after the  union 
reference wage has been met. 
 
In general, it is hoped that the paper will provide a  stimulus for further 
research into the consequences of adopting ideas like the union reference 
wage. 
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